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[So F. No. 19249. In Bank. Oct. 30,1956.]

LEOLA WASHINGTON, Respondent, v. GEORGE
WASHINGTON, Appellant.
[1J Husband and Wife-Actions Against Third Persons-For Personal Injuries to Spouse.-An injured spouse's cause of action
for personal injuries differs from ordinary community property
in that the entire cause of action survives to him or her on
the other spouse's death.
[2J ld.-Actions Against Third Persons-For Personal Injuries to
Spouse.-Civ. Code, § 956, providing that certain actions shall
not abate on the death of one or another of the parties, does
not affect a surviving spouse's interest in his or her cause of
action for his or her own injuries.
[8] ld.-Actions Against Third Persons-For Personal Injuries to
Spouse.-A spouse's entire cause of action for his or her own
personal injuries vests by operation of law in such spouse
when the marriage is dissolved by divorce; and this does not
violate the rule that such actions do not fully survive or the
rule that they are not Rssignable. (Civ. Code, § 956.)
[4] ld.-Actions Against Third Persons-For Personal Injuries to
Spouse.-In the absence of a rule permitting the apportionment
[1] See Cal.J'ur.2d, Husband and Wife, § 92 et seq.
Melt. Dig. Reference: [1-5] Husband and Wife, § 185(1).
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of the elements of a spouse's cause of action for personal
injuries between the spouses' separate and community interests, treating the entire cause of action as community property
protects the community interest in the elements that clearly
ahQuld belong to it, and though such a rule may be justified
when it appears that the marriage will continue, it loses its
force when the marriage is dissolved after the cause of action
accrues, since in such a case not only may the personal elements of damages such as past pain and suffering be reasonably
treated as belonging to the injured party, but the damages for
future pain and suffering, future expenses and future loss of
earnings are attributable to him as a single person following
the divorce.
[lil Id.-Actions Against Third Persons-For Personal Injuries to
Spouse.-Where no judgment in a husband's action for personal
injuries against a municipality and the driver of a police car
was entered against the municipality until after entry of a
final divorce decree, and the judgment against the driver did
not become final until after that time, the divorced wife
acquired no interest in either judgment, since the cause of
action against the municipality was not assignable and the
judgment against the driver could not be assigned until it
became final, and the entire cause of action vested in the
injured husband on dissolution of the marriage.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of the
City and County of San Francisco. George W. Schonfeld,
Judge. Reversed.
Action for declaratory relief and partition. Judgment for
plaintiff reversed.
Edward D. Mabson for Appellant.
Carl B. l\{etoyer, Terry A. Francois and l\{urvIDe C. Abels
for Respondent.
TRAYNOR, J.-Plaintiit and defendant were married in
October, 1944, and separated in August, 1946. There was one
child of the marriage. In October, 1946, plaintiff filed an
action for divorce on the grounds of extreme cruelty, and
defendant answered putting the existing property rights of
the parties in issue. In September, 1948, defendant lost a
leg as a result of a eollision between a San Francisco poliee
car and a car driven by Mervin E. Garner. He filed an
action against the city and county of San Francisco and
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Garner, and in December, 1950, the jury returned a verdict
against both defendants for $85,000. Judgment was entered on
the verdict against Garner, but the trial court granted the
city and county's motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict. The judgment against Garner became final in August,
1951, after he dismissed his appeal. The judgment in favor
of the city and county was reversed on appeal with directions
to enter judgment on the verdict. The city and county then
moved for a new trial, and following the denial of its motion,
appealed from the judgment, which was affirmed and became
final in April, 1954. In the meantime, the divorce action was
brought to trial, and an interlocutory decree in favor of plaintiff was entered in March, 1950. No supplemental pleadings
were filed putting in issue the parties' rights in the cause
of action for deiendant's personal injuries, and no disposition
of property rights was made in the interlocutory decree and
no alimony or child support was awarded. 1 The custody of
the minor daughter of the parties was awarded to plaintiff. A
final decree of divorce was entered in May, 1951, and plaintiff
remarried in November, 1952. After the judgment against
the city and county became final in 1954, plaintiff brought
this action for declaratory relief and partition asserting the
right to half of defendant's recovery. Deductions were made
for attorneys' fees and costs advanced by them, and judgment
was entered in favor of plaintiff for $34,087.11, half the
remainder, plus costs and interest. Defendant appeals.
[1] In Kesler v. Pabst, 43 Ca1.2d 254, 258 [273 P.2d 257],
we pointed out that although a wife's cause of action for
personal injuries is community property, it differs from ordi- .
nary community property in that on her husband's death the
entire cause of action survives to her by operation of law.
He "cannot, either by exercising or failing to exercise his
power of testamentary disposition over half of the community
property, affect his wife's rights in her cause of action."
Although the Kesler case was concerned with the wife's cause
of action for her injuries, there is no reason to treat the
husband's cause of action for his injuries differently. As
pointed out in the Kesler ease, the reason the wife's entire
cause of action survived to her was to prevent her lOBS of
full recovery for her injury by the abatement of her husband's
interest in her cause of action on his death. (Moody v.
aIt appears that the community property referred to in the pleadings
had been exhauBted before trial and that defendant was unable be·
e&U8e of hiI injury to earn money to p~ alimony or ohild Apport.
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Southern Pac. 00., 167 Cal. 786, 790·791 [141 P. 388J) For
the same reason the husband's entire cause of action for his
injuries survives to him on his wife's death. [2) It is true
that in 1949 the Legislature enacted section 956 2 of the Civil
Code providing for the survival of causes of action for personal
injuries, and it may be contended that it is no longer necessary
for the entire cause of action to survive to the injured spouse
to prevent its partial abatement on the death of the other.
To interpret section 956 as changing the rule of the Moody case,
however, would require reading into it words that are not
there. As here relevant that section provides that certain
actions shall not abate on the death of one or another of the
parties, but it contains no provisions affecting causes of action
that would not otherwise abate on such a death. Accordingly,
since under the rule of the Moody case, an injured spouse's
cause of action has never abated in whole or in part on the
death of the other spouse, section 956 does not affect the
surviving spouse's interest in his or her cause of action for
his or her own injuries.
(3) In the present case the marriage was dissolved by
divorce rather than death, and the question presented is
whether a cause of action for personal injuries vests by operation of law in the injured party when the marriage is dissolved by divorce. We have concluded that just as the rule
that personal actions abated on the death of the plaintiff
compelled treating a spouse's cause of action for personal
injuries differently from other community property in its
devolution on the death of the other spouse, the rule prohibiting the assignment of such a cause of action compels
the same disposition of the cause of action when the marriage
is dissolved by divorce. (See Ohase v. Ohase, 72 Mass. (6
Gray) 157,159.) It is significant in this respect that although
the Legislature has provided for the survival of such causes
"'A thing in action arising out of a wrong which results in physical
injury to the person or out of a statute imposing liability for such
injury shall not abate by reason of the death of the wrongdoer or
any other person liable for damages for such injury, nor by reason
of the death of the person injured or of any other person who owns
any such thing in action. When the person entitled to maintain such
an action dies before judgment, the damages recoverable for such in·
jury shall be limited to loss of earnings and expenses sustained or
incurred as a result of the injury by the deceased prior to his death,
and shall not include damages for pain, suffering or disfigurement,
nor punitive or exemplary damages, nor prospective profits or earn·
ings after the date of death. The damages recovered shall form part
of the estate of the deceased. Nothing in this article shall be construed
.. maldna AU • thine in action assignable."
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of action, it has expressly retained the rule that they are not
assignable. (Civ. Code, § 956.) Clearly the court in a divorce
action could not exercise its power to assign the community
property (e. g., by assigning all or a major share of a spouse's
cause of action for personal injuries to the other in a case of
adultery or extreme cruelty) over a cause of action for personal injuries without violating the foregoing rule. (See
Civ. Code, § 146.) Moreover, it would be anomalous if such
personal elements of damages as pain, suffering, and disfigurement, which still abate on the death of the injured party (Civ.
Code, § 956), should be assignable to the other spouse in the
case of divorce. On the other hand, the rule by which the
entire cause of action vests in the injured party on death or
divorce does not violate the rule that such actions do not fully
survive or the rule that they are not assignable. (Moody v.
A~outhern Pac. Co., supra, 167 Cal. 786, 790-791; Kesler v.
Pabst, supra, 43 Ca1.2d 254, 258.)
It is not unfair to the uninjured spouse to terminate his
or her interest in the other's cause of action for personal
injuries on divorce. The rule that a spouse's cause of action
for personal injuries is necessarily community property has
been criticized on the ground that it fails to distinguish between damages that could reasonably be considered personal
to the injured spouse such a'! those for pain, suffering, and
disfigurement and damages properly belonging to the community such as those for loss of earning power, past and future
medical expenses incurred or to be incurred, and disability
of the injured spouse directly to contribute to the community
venture. (See 1 de Funiak, Principles of Community PropertY,225-230.) [4] A rule permitting apportionment of the
damages as suggested, however, has never been adopted in this
state, and in the absence thereof, treating the entire cause
of action as community property protects the community
interest in the elements that clearly should belong to it. (See
2 Armstrong, California Family Law 1513.) Although such
a rule may be justified when it appears that the marriage will
continue, it loses its force when the marriage is dissolved after
the cause of action accrues. In such a case not only may the
personal elements of damages such as past pain and suffering
be reasonably treated as belonging to the injured party, but
the damages for future pain and suffering, future expenses,
and future loss of earnings are clearly attributable to him as
a Bingle person following the divorce. Moreover, 88 in any
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other case involving future earnings or other after acquired
property, the wife's right, if any, to future support may be
protected by an award of alimony. Since we have no rule
permitting the apportionment of the elements of a cause of
action for personal injuries between the spouses' separate and
community interests and since such a cause of action is not
assignable, it must vest in the injured party on the dissolution
of the marriage.
[6] In the present case no judgment was entered against
the city and county until after the entry of the final decree
of divorce, and the judgment against Garner did not become
final until after that time. Accordingly, since the cause of
action against the city and county was not assignable and
the judgment against Garner could not be assigned until it
became final (Pacific Gas &- Elec. Co. v. Nakano, 12 Ca1.2d
711, 713-714 [87 P.2d 700, 121 A.L.R. 417] ; see 121 A.L.R.
420), plaintiff acquired no interest in either judgment.
The judgment is reversed.

)

Gibson, C. J., Schauer, J., Spence, J., and McComb, J., concurred.
CARTER, J.-I concur in the result reached in the majority opinion.
I think it is clear, however, that this court now recognizes
that its former opinions, holding that causes of action for
personal injuries are community property, are unrealistic
and outmoded.
In Zaragosa v. Craven, 33 Ca1.2d 315 [202 P.2d 73, 6 A.L.R.
2d 461], in which I dissented, it was held that CC • • • it must be
considered as the present law of this state that the cause of
action for personal injuries suffered by either spouse during
marriage, to whatever extent such cause of action may constitute property (see p. 725, Franklin v. Franklin, supra [67
Cal.App.2d 717 (155 P.2d 637)]), as well as any recovery
therefor, constitutes community property-at least in the
absence of agreement otherwise between the spouses. Any
contrary implications which may be derived from the language of the Franklin case are disapproved."
The accident here involved occurred after the plaintiff had
sued for divorce, but before the interlocutory decree was
entered. The parties were therefore still husband and wife
despite the fact that the divorce action had been filed almost
two years prior to the accident in which defendant was
injured.
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I am of the opinion now, as I have always been, that a
cause of action for personal injuries is a separate and personal
one and that the recovery therefor should be the separate
property of the injured spouse except for the actual loss to
the community in the earning power of the injured spouse
(see dissenting opinion in Zaragosa v. Craven, 33 Ca1.2d 315,
323, 324 [202 P.2d 73, 6 A.L.R.2d 461]). As I have heretofore pointed out in my dissents (Zaragosa v. Craven, supra;
Flores v. Brown, 39 Ca1.2d 622, 633 [248 P.2d 922]; and
Kesler v. Pabst, 43 Cal.2d 254, 260 [273 P.2d 257]) there is
no reason whatsoever to characterize a cause of action for
personal injuries a "community cause of action." The wife,
or husband, has a right to sue in her, or his, own name (Code
Civ. Proc., § 370; Sanderson v. Niernann, 17 Cal.2d 563, 567
[110 P.2d 1025]) and the recovery therefor 'should be the
individual's sole and separate property (de Funiak, Principles of Community Property, pp. 225, 232; 24 Cal.L.Rev.
739; Rest., Torts, § 487).
In Zaragosa v. Craven, supra, a majority of this court
held that a cause of action for personal injuries which arose
during the marriage relationship was community property
(thereby overruling a contrary statement in Franklin v.
Franklin, 67 Cal.App.2d 717 [155 P.2d 637]). In F'lores v.
Brown, supra, Mr. Flores died as a result of the accident giving
rise to Mrs. Flores' cause of action and, in order to avoid
its former rule of imputation of contributory negligence, a
majority of this court decided that even though the cause
of action arose during marriage, that marriage was terminated
by Mr. Flores' death at the time of the accident and therefore
the entire cause of action devolved to Mrs. Flores and that
the contributory negligence of Mr. Flores was not imputable
to her. I pointed out in my dissent in Kesler v. Pabst, supra,
that the holding in the Flores' case was quite inconsistent with
the majority holding in the Zaragosa case.
It has been said quite often and with a great deal of
truth that "hard cases make bad law."
In the instant case, a woman who has brought suit against
her husband for divorce and who was separated from him,
seeks to recover half of the compensation awarded him for
an injury which took place while the marriage was still in
being although after suit for divorce had been filed. If what
was said in the Zaragosa case is still the law, the cause of
action aooruing during the existence of the marital relation. ship. because of defendant's personal injuries, was community
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property and any judgment recovered as a result thereof
should relate back so as to take on the same character.
In the case under consideration, however, in neither the
original complaint for divorce, nor in the amended complaint,
did Mrs. Washington allege the cause of action for Washington's personal injury to be community property and pray
for a division thereof when the same had been reduced to
final judgment.
.AB Mr. de Funiak aptly said (Principles of Community
Property, p. 225): "Their [courts] usual decision to consider the property received in exchange for separate property
as taking the character of separate property is a fortunate
triumph of common sense over a lack of understanding of the
principles of community property. But apparently the courts
are inclined to apply a similar reasoning to the right of
action for personal injuries and to the compensation received;
that is, it is a property acquired during marriage and is not
acquired by gift, etc., therefore it must be community property. But this overlooks the principles of onerous and lucrative
title~ and other pertinent principles. Except for gifts clearly
made to the marital community, community property only
consists of that which is acquired by onerous title, that is,
by labor or industry of the spouses, or which is acquired in
exchange for community property (which, of course, was
acquired itself by onerous title, again with the exception
as to the gift). It must be plainly evident that a right of
action for injuries to person, reputation, property, or
the like or the compensation received therefor, is not property
acquired by onerous title. The labor and industry of the
spouses did not bring it into being. For that matter it is
not property acquired by lucrative title either. . . . Since the
right of action for injury to the person . • • is intended to
repair or make whole the injury, so far as is possible in such
a case, the compensation partakes of the same character as that
which has been injured or suffered loss."
If this court would hold, logically and reasonably, once
and for all that a cause of action for personal injuries was
personal to the injured spouse and that the recovery constituted his, or her, separate property (see Civ. Code, § 171c, as
it relates to the wife) then it would not be necessary to
engage in legal acrobatics in a case such as this in order to
reach a just result. I have no complaint with the statements
in the majority opinion that the causes of action for the
personal injuries to Mr. Washington were not assignable and
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t.hat no assignments thereof could be had until final judgments
had been rendered therein. When this case and the Flores
case are considered together, it appears to me that perhaps, in
time, a majority of this court will recognize the fallacy in
earlier holdings that a cause of action for personal injuries
accruing during marriage is community property.
I am happy to see a majority ·of the members of this court
depart from the rule of the Zaragosa case which, if carried
to its logical conclusion, would have prevented the conclusion
reached in Flores v. Brown, supra, and the just result
reached in the case under consideration. I am hopeful that
in time the court will come to the full realization that a cause
(If action for personal injuries and the compensation received
therefor is personal to the injured person since such cause
of action and compensation were always intended as a substitutefor the violation of a personal right. The majority
opinion, however illogical in the light of the rule of the
Zaragosa case, is a small step in the right direction.
SHENK, J., Dissenting.-In no uncertain terms the Legislature has classified property owned by spouses before marriage and property acquired by them after marriage. Since
,1872 section 162 of the Civil Code has provided that "All
property of the wife owned by her before marriage, and that
acquired afterwards by gift, bequest, devise, or descent, . . .
is her separate property." And for a like period section
163 of the same code has provided that, "All property owned
by the husband before marriage, and that acquired afterward
by gift, bequest, devise and descent, . . . is his separate property. " Section 164 then and since has provided that, "All
othel: property acquired after marriage by either husband or
wife, or both .•. is community property."
Without question the right of action acquired by the
defendant was property. It was a chose in action and personal
property as defined by section 14 of the Civil Code. (See also
6 West's Anno.Cal. Code, p. 67, and cases cited in n. 15.) It
was acquired during the marriage and lifetime of the spouses
and before the entry of the interlocutory decree. That decree
did not sever the marriage relationship. On the record here
presented the cause of action and the fund derived therefrom
continued to be community property. (Brown v. Brown, 170
Cal. 1 [147 P. 1168].) Such a cause of action was held to be
community property in Zara,gosa v. Oraven, 33 Cal.2d 315
[202 P.2d 73, 6 A.L.R.2d 461], and that case cannot be dis4? C.2d.....
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tinguished from the case at bar. The property right here
involved was either the separate property of the defendant or
the community property of the spouses. It could not be both.
The Legislature has so defined separate property as to exclude
it from that category. The Legislature has also declared that
all property not defined as separate property is community
property. Now the court holds that all does not mean all,
and declares in effect that the cause of action was not community property. The statutory definitions include all property
of whatever description own~d or acquired by the spouses.
The fund here involved is certainly not included within the
definition of separate property and is therefore community
property.
I can see no justification for setting at nought the decision
in the Zaragosa case and other cases cited therein in support
thereof. The District Court of Appeal of the First District,
Division Two, affirmed the judgment in a well considered
opinion authored by Mr. Justice Dooling and reported in 296
P.2d 896. For the reasons stated in that opinion and on the
authority of the Zaragosa and other cases to like effect, I
would adhere to the plain language of the statute as heretofore
applied by this court and affirm the judgment.

